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Abstract—Security and privacy are fundamental prerequisites
for the deployment of vehicular communications. The near-
deployment status of Safety Applications for Intelligent Transport
Systems (ITS) calls for strong evidence on the applicability of
proposed research solutions, notably close-to-reality situations
and field-operational trials. The contribution of our work is in
this direction: We present a demonstration of the integration and
the interoperability among components and security mechanisms
coming from different Research and Development projects, as per
the PRESERVE project. In fact, we show that the components
of the SeVeCom and EVITA projects with the PRESERVE
architecture lead to strong and practical security and privacy
solutions for Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs).
Index Terms—Security, privacy, ITS, interoperability,
PRESERVE, EVITA
I. INTRODUCTION
For Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS), vehicles and road-
side infrastructure are equipped with on-board sensor devices,
computers, and wireless communication modules. ITS rely
on Vehicular Communications (VC), i.e. Vehicle-to-Vehicle
(V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communication, to
enable transportation safety and efficiency and other applica-
tions [1].
Strong but also practical security enhancing mechanisms
need to be integrated in the VC [2]. Privacy requirements need
also to be addressed [3], especially with the frequent broad-
casting of positioning information. This led to the Secure Ve-
hicle Communication (SeVeCom) [4] and the Privacy Enabled
Capability in Co-operative Systems and Safety Applications
(PRECIOSA) [5] projects, as well standardization efforts by
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) [6],
IEEE 1609 WG [7] and the institution of the Car2Car Com-
munication Consortium (C2C-CC).
Nevertheless not only the VC have to be secured, but also
the vehicle internal communication buses should be protected
against tampering attacks [8]. The objective of the E-safety
Vehicle Intrusion protected Applications (EVITA) project was
to develop a secure automotive on-board network [9].
Based on the conclusions of past and on-going Field Op-
erational Tests (FOTs), such as Système COopératif Routier
Expérimental Français (SCORE@F), safety applications have
reached a near-deployment maturity state. The Preparing
Secure Vehicle-to-X Communication Systems (PRESERVE)
research project [10] plays a crucial role in this direction,
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Figure 1: Illustration of the various components involved in
the demonstration.
bringing in strong and practical security and privacy protec-
tion, notably in field testing. With all the above efforts, an
integrated, comprehensive solution, and a practical evaluation,
i.e. FOTs, towards deployment of an overall secure architecture
for automotive networks.
In this paper we briefly describe the overall integration
of components in Sec. II, notably to achieve interoperability
between EVITA on-board system and the PRESERVE archi-
tecture. In Sec. III we describe the demonstration setup.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The system architecture for this demonstration is derived
from the PRESERVE project. We have components from the
vehicle on-board network plus secure communication capa-
bilities. Figure 1 shows the relationships among components
from the involved project [10].
A. On-Board Network
Modern cars are equipped with several embedded Elec-
tronic Control Units (ECUs), which are interconnected via
various vehicular buses. The exchanged information can be
critical for the safety of the car itself or nearby vehicles. The
EVITA project defines an architecture for automotive on-board
networks, where security-relevant components are protected
against tampering, and sensitive data are protected against
compromise. To achieve this degree of security, a trusted
Hardware Security Module (HSM) that provides generation
and verification of Message Authentication Codes (MACs), is
attached to each ECU.
B. On-Board Unit
The vehicles are also equipped with an On-Board Unit
(OBU) that runs the ITS applications, the communication
facilities (i.e. radio, communication stack), and it is connected
to the on-board network. The OBU is responsible for trans-
mitting packets according to the ETSI GeoNetworking (GN)
protocol, and it also integrates the IEEE 1609 standard. The
OBU includes also the VC Security Subsystem (VSS) that
provides security services to protect on-board communication
and external VC.
C. Hardware Security Modules
The embedded ECUs and the VSS use a Hardware Se-
curity Module (HSM) to accelerate cryptographic primitives
and securely store cryptographic credentials. Different HSMs
attached to each ECU are defined in the EVITA project. The
HSM dedicated to the VSS has been developed within the
PRESERVE project in a form of Field-Programmable Gate
Array (FPGA).
III. DEMONSTRATION SETUP
The proposed demonstration includes different devices,
standing for two ITS vehicles acting as a transmitter and a
receiver, respectively. We demonstrate the overall security and
notably the the secure V2V communication.
One vehicle is represented by: (i) a Laptop, running the on
board network, (ii) a 802.11p modem with the GN communi-
cation stack and the PRESERVE module, to which (iii) the
PRESERVE FPGA is connected, to enable the hardware
accelerated cryptographic functions and secure storage.
Laptops run a generic GNU/Linux operating system, and
they host all the EVITA components, and interconnected inter-
nally. Each Laptop also hosts a Graphic User Interface (GUI)
that displays the data and the related MAC, generated from the
sensor and verified by the ECU, always using the EVITA HSM
in software version. It also displays the vehicle’s signature
generation and verification. Figure 2 shows a screenshot of
the GUI window.
Each Laptop is connected to a 802.11p Cohda MK3 modem
via ethernet cable. Those modems are ARM based devices,
running a modified version of the GNU/Linux operating
system. We included in the modems the GN protocol stack
for VC, implemented by Hitachi Europe in the context of
SCORE@F. The ECU will transmit the internally verified
message to the GN stack, where it will be signed under the
vehicle’s current pseudonym and broadcasted over the 5.9 GHz
Figure 2: The whole demo setup and GUI that shows the
triggered events and their transmission and reception.
wireless band. The ECU and the modem together constitute
the OBU.
The message is then received by the second vehicle’s
modem and it is verified by the other FPGA, while going
upstream in the GN stack. If the verification is successful,
the message is forwarded to the ECU where a new MAC is
attached, and it finally reaches the actuator that verifies the
integrity. The overall setup is illustrated in Figure 2.
In conclusion, we provide a milestone towards the integra-
tion between multiple projects, to achieve a single consistent
implementation of a secure and privacy-aware ITS architec-
ture.
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